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Abstract
Agenor attempts  to examine analytically  and empirically  terms  of trade, health and schooling indicators, and
the extent to which globalization  affects the poor in low-  macroeconomic  volatility.  The author uses not only
and middle-income  countries.  He begins with a  individual  indicators of trade and  financial openness but
description  of various channels  through which trade  also a "globalization  index" based  on principal
openness and financial integration  may have  an adverse  components analysis,  and tests for both linear  and
effect on poverty.  However, the author  also stresses the  nonlinear effects.
possible nonlinearities  involved-possibilities that have  The results suggest the existence  of a nonmonotonic,
seldom been recognized  in the ongoing debate. Agenor  Laffer-type relationship  between globalization  and
then presents  cross-country regressions that relate  poverty.  At low levels, globalization  appears to hurt the
measures  of real and financial integration  to poverty.  poor; but beyond a certain threshold,  it seems to reduce
The regressions control for changes in income per capita  poverty-possibly because  it brings with it renewed
and output growth  rates, as well  as various other  impetus for reform.  So,  globalization  may hurt the poor
macroeconomic  and structural variables,  such as the  not because it went too far,  but rather  because it did not
inflation tax, changes  in the real exchange rate and the  go far enough.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Globalization-defined  as  the  process  through  which  goods  and  services,
capital, people,  information  and  ideas  flow  across  borders  and  lead  to greater
integration of economies and societies-has made substantial advances in recent
decades  and  is viewed  by  many as an  inescapable feature  of the world today.
There  are,  undoubtedly,  significant  potential  benefits  to  globalization.  For
instance, it is now well recognized that openness  to foreign  direct investment can
contribute to growth by stimulating domestic investment,  improving efficiency and
productivity (as a result of greater  access to new technologies),  or by increasing
the  "knowledge"  applied  to  production.  Oppnness  to  capital  flows  may  also
increase opportunities for portfolio risk diversification and consumption smoothing
through  borrowing and  lending; and producers who are able to diversify risks  on
world capital markets may invest in more risky (and  higher-yield) projects, thereby
raising the country's  rate of economic growth  (Obsffeld (1994)).  Increased access
to the  domestic financial system by foreign  banks may raise the efficiency of the
intermediation  process  between savers and  borrowers,  thereby lowering  markup
rates  in  banking,  as  well  as  the  cost  of investment,  and  raising  growth  rates
(Baldwin  and  Forslid  (2000)).  More  directly, to the extent that financial openness
helps to mitigate  asymmetric information  problems  and to reduce the fixed  costs
associated with small-scale  lending, it can  improve the opportunities for the poor
to access the formal financial system.'
Similarly, openness  to trade may generate significant gains, both static and
dynamic.  Satic economic  gains,  as  emphasized  by  conventional  trade  theory,
1As discussed by Eichengreen  (2001),  however, although there is  evidence suggesting that
financial  openness  and  financial  development  may  raise  growth-as  in Bekaert,  Harvey  and
Lundblad (2002),  Bosworth  and Collins (2000),  Jalilian and  Kirkpatrick (2002), and  Levine (2000)-
there  is  some  debate  as to the exact  magnitude  of these  effects.  Klein  and Olivei (2001),  for
instance,  analyzed  the effects of capital account liberalization  on growth  and financial depth for a
cross-section  of countries  over the  period  1986-95.  They  found that  countries with  open capital
accounts  experienced  a  larger  increase  in financial  depth  than  countries  with  closed  capital
accounts,  and through that channel, higher rates  of economic growth. However,  this positive effect
3refer to the fact that under greater openness to trade,  productive  resources tend
to be reallocated toward  activities where they are used with comparatively greater
efficiency  and  away  from  less  efficient  activities  (such  as  import-substitution
industries  or  rent-seeking  activities).  In addition,  the  literature  on  endogenous
growth  has emphasized  the existence of various mechanisms through which trade
openness may generate  dynamic  gains and thereby affect the economy's  rate of
growth  in the long  run.  In particular,  it has been  argued that trade  openness may
facilitate  the  acquisition  of  new  inputs,  less  expensive  or  higher-quality
intermediate  goods,  and  improved  technologies,  which  enhance  the  overall
productivity  of the  economy.  Romer  (1994),  for  instance,  has  argued  that  in  an
economy  subject  to  trade  restrictions,  only  a  narrow  range  of  specialized
intermediate goods  or capital goods can  be profitably produced and therefore the
full range  of technological  possibilities, which  rely on  a  potentially broader range
of inputs, cannot  be exploited  effectively.  In this  model  a greater variety of inputs
does  more  for  production  than  a  greater  quantity  of  a  narrow  range  of inputs.
Thus, access to a variety of foreign  inputs at a lower cost shifts the economy-wide
production possibility frontier outward,  thereby raising  productivity.2 Moreover,  the
mechanism  through  which  increased  productivity  and  growth  rates  occur  as
economies  become  open  to  intemational  trade  is  not  limited  to the  adoption  of
more  specialized  intermediate  inputs  and  machinery  available  from  trading
partners;  there  are  many  types  of  useful  knowledge  that  are  not  embodied  in
material  inputs  (such as  production  engineering  and  information  about changing
product  patterns),  but  can  also  be  transferred  as  a result  of  trade  with  more
advanced  countries.  As argued  by Romer (1992),  in  practice, the transmission of
appears  to be  significant only for industrial countries,  not for developing countries.  Carkovic  and
Levine (2002) also failed to find a robust, independent effect of FDI on growth.
2  Several  other contributions  have emphasized  the  role  of the  international  diffusion  and
adoption of new technologies or new goods. Grossman  and Helpman (1991)  and  Rivera-Batiz and
Romer  (1991),  for  instance,  developed  models  in  which  technology  is  produced  by  profit-
maximizing  firms.  They showed  that openness  to  international  markets  can  increase  the growth
rate  of technology  by increasing  the  size of the  market  available  to  technology  producers  and
allowing those  countries with  a comparaffve  advantage in  technology  production  to  specialize in
that activity.  International  trade  may also  improve  domestic  productivity and  economic growth  by
increasing knowledge spillovers from  more advanced trading  partners.  Baldwin  and  Forslid (2000)
4ideas  may  be as important,  if not more  important,  than the transmission  of new
inputs.
There  is indeed  some  empirical  evidence suggesting  that trade integration
has  beneficial  effects  on the  level and  growth  rate of output. Studies  by Frankel
and Romer (1999) and Irwin and Tervio (2002)  have shown that countries that are
more open to trade have higher incomes.  In line with more recent theories of trade
and  growth,  Klenow  and  Rodriguez-clare  (1997)  used  a  computable  general
equilibrium  framework  that  accounts  for  product  variety  effects  through  a
production function in which a lower number of intermediate input varieties results
in productivity losses and lower output, despite the same capital and labor inputs.
They found that accounting  for such  effects  can  quadruple the static gains from
unilateral  trade  liberalization.  Coe,  Helpman,  and  Hoffmaister  (1997)  found  that
trade flows provide a conduit through which advanced  production techniques and
technological  knowledge  are  transmitted  across  countries.3 Wacziarg  (1998)
found  that  investment  is  the  most  important  channel  through  which  openness
raises  growth,  accounting for more  than 60 percent of the total effect.  Moreover,
the  empirical  evidence  also  suggests  that  the  leaming-by-doing  and  growth
effects of these spillovers are largest in countries with higher levels of education.
Finally, a recent study by the World  Bank (2002)  suggests that the countries that
have  opened  themselves  the  most to trade  in  the  last two  decades  (the  "new
globalizers") have,  on average,  grown  the fastest. These  countries  managed to
reduce import tariffs, on average,  by 34 percentage points since 1980, compared
with  only  11  percentage  points  for those developing  countries  that,  on  average,
saw no growth  in per capita  incomes  over the period.  Because trade  is good  for
growth, and growth  is allegedly good for the poor (on average,  increased growth
raises the incomes of the poor in proportion to those of the population as claimed
by Dollar  and  Kraay  (2001))  the study  concludes that trade  (or,  more  generally,
extend  the  Grossman-Helpman  framework  to  account  for  imperfect  competition  and  scale
economies in  the research and development sector.
5intemational  economic  integration)  is  good  for  the  poor.  Nevertheless,  as  for
financial integration, there  is  significant controversy as to the exact magnitude (if
not  direction)  of  the  benefits  associated  with  trade  liberalization.  In  a detailed
review of some the existing  empirical studies, for instance,  Rodriguez and  Rodrik
(1999) suggest a cautious assessment of their robustness.
Moreover,  it  is  now  increasingly  recognized  that  the  process  of
globalization  entails  significant  risks  and  potentially  large  economic  and  social
costly.  Openness  to  global  capital  markets  has  brought  greater  volatility  in
domestic financial  markets,  particularly in countries whose financial systems were
weak  to begin  with  and  economic  policies  lacked  credibility. Large  reversals  in
short-term  capital  flows  (induced  by the  volatility of world  capital markets)  have
led to severe financial crises and sharp increases in unemployment and poverty in
the short  run.  Similarly, trade  liberalization has  led in  some countries  to reduced
demand for unskilled labor and lower real wages in the short run; combined with a
low  degree  of inter-sectoral  labor mobility, job losses and  income declines have
often translated  into  higher  poverty  rates.4 As a result,  there  have  been growing
concems about the negative effects of globalization, and an increasingly polarized
debate  on  the  plight  of the  world's  poorest--namely,  whether  many  of the  1.2
billion  people who still  live on  less than  $1 a  day are sharing  in  the  benefits  of
greater  integration  among  economies  and  instead  are  disproportionately  hit  by
short-run  crises and economic downtums.
The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  try  to  assess,  using  cross-country
econometric  techniques,  the  extent  to  which  globalization  may  indeed  hurt the
poor.  Cross-country  regressions--most  notably in the  context of empirical growth
economics--have  been  the  subject of criticism  for their ad hoc  specification and
the fragility of many of the results that they lead to (see Temple  (1999)). They are,
3  As  mentoned  earlier,  foreign  direct  investment  provides  another,  perhaps  more  direct,
route  through  which  technology  and advanced  managerial  and  producton  techniques  can  flow
from industrial to developing countries.
6nevertheless,  useful  tools  with  significant  advantages  over  "event"  or  "case"
studies. Such studies generally suffer from sample selectivity bias and are unable
to  isolate  with  any  degree  of  precision  the  independent  effect  of  a  particular
variable  or  set  of  variables  (that  is,  in  the  present  context,  the  impact  of
globalization  on  poverty,  as  opposed  to  domestic  factors).  Although  the
econometric  methodology  used  in  this  paper does  not  allow  one  to take  a  firm
stand  regarding  issues such as causality,  it provides  a useful first step  (subject to
the  caveats  discussed  below)  in  an  attempt  to  disentangle  the  effects  of
globalization per se on poverty, while at the same time controlling for a number of
other determinants.
The  paper is organized as follows. Section II identifies various mechanisms,
related  to  both  trade  openness  and  financial  integration,  through  which
globalization  may  hurt  the  poor.  This  review  is  by  no  means  exhaustive;  my
objective  here  is  mainly  to  show  that  although  there  are  very  good  analytical
arguments  to  suggest  that  globalization  may  benefit  the  poor  (as  discussed
earlier),  there  are  equally  plausible  ones  that  support  the  view  that  trade  or
financial  integration  may  have  an  adverse  effect  on  poverty.  By  implication,
determining whether globalization is (on net)  "good" or "bad"  for the poor is--as is
often the case in economics--an  empirical  issue,  not a  matter of faith. This is by
no means a claim to novelty but rather a reminder  of a point that has  often  been
"lost"  by partisan views on both sides of the debate.  I also emphasize the fact that
the relationship  between  trade and  financial openness and  poverty  may be non-
monotonic. This is also important,  not only because the  possibility of a nonlinear
relationship  has seldom  been  recognized  in  the debate,  but also  because  it has
implications for empirical tests.5 Section  III discusses the basic specification of the
41mperfect labor mobility across sectors seems indeed to have characterized several recent
episodes of trade reform in  developing countries (see  Seddon and Wacziarg (2001)).
5  Edwards  (2001)  did  point  out  the  possibility  that  capital  account  openness  may  be
beneficial  only once a certain  level  of development  is reached.  Similarly,  Bekaert,  Harvey and
Lundblad  (2002)  found  that  the  impact  of  financial  liberalizaton  on  growth  depends  on  the
country's level of secondary school enrollment.  However, Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001)
found that Edwards'  results were not robust;  and Bekaert,  Harvey  and  Lundblad  focused only on
stock market liberalization.
7regression  model  (including the  choice of control  variables)  and  explains the two
dimensions  through  which  globalization  is  measured.  By  necessity,  my
operational definition  of "globalization"  is narrower  than what the concept usually
involves (as defined earlier);  I focus on  measures of trade and financial openness
(which  indirectly  captures  technology  transfers),  but  I  do  not  capture  the
potentially important  effects of labor  and  information  flows.  Section  IV discusses
some basic (linear)  regression results. Section V extends the analysis to construct
a "globalization  index"  based on principal components  analysis. This index is then
used to perform  both linear and nonlinear regressions--using  in the latter case the
squared  value of the index. I also discuss some  robustness tests associated with
these  regressions.  Section VI  offers  some  concluding  remarks  and  stresses the
need for further empirical testing.
1.  HOW GLOBALIZATION  MAY HURT THE  POOR
It is actually not very difficult to think of a number of channels through  which
the  process  of globalization  may  hurt  the  poor.  Some  of the  most  ardent  "pro-
globalization" advocates would admit that, for instance, trade reform  in developing
countries  may lead  in the short run  to higher unemployment  and greater poverty,
as a result of pervasive  labor market  distortions-such  as a low  degree  of wage
flexibility  and  imperfect  labor  mobility  across  sectors.  In this  section  I want  to
emphasize,  without trying to be  exhaustive,  the possibility that globalization  may
affect  poverty  adversely in  the  long  run  as  well.  I first  describe  some  possible
channels  through  which  trade  liberalization  may  increase  poverty,  and  then
proceed to do the same for financial integration.  I conclude this brief overview by
stressing  the importance  of understanding  the  possible discontinuities and  other
nonlinearities that may arise in trying  to assess the direction and  strength  of the
link between globalization and poverty. Throughout the discussion, I will stress not
only the possible direct effects of globalization  on the poor,  but also the indirect
8effects  that  may  operate  through  the  rate  of  economic  growth--a  fairly  well-
documented empirical regularity.
1. Trade Openness
Although,  as  noted  in  the  introduction,  there  are  some  good  arguments
suggesting  that trade  liberalization  may improve  resource allocation  in  the short
term or raise growth  rates permanently (and thus be beneficial to the poor), there
are  a number of other arguments suggesting the opposite.6 Opening a  country's
markets  to  foreign  firms,  for  instance,  tends  to  reduce  the  market  power  of
domestic  firms  and  increase  competitive  pressures  on  them,  eventually  forcing
(some  of) them out of business. In the longer run,  the country may well  become
more  efficient  in  using  its  productive  resources,  thereby  enjoying  higher  growth
rates  and  lower  poverty.  But  in the short term,  the  inability to  compete,  and  the
presence  of  labor  market  rigidities  (segmentation  due  to  minimum  wage
legislation or wage-setting  behavior by firms or trade unions, as well as imperfect
mobility  across  sectors),  may  hamper  the  reallocation  of  labor  between
nontradables  and  tradables  that a reduction  in  tariffs  normally  entails  (see,  for
instance,  Agenor  and  Aizenman  (1996)).  As  a  result,  both  unemployment  and
poverty may increase and persist over time.
Similarly,  the effects of scale economies and leaming-by-doing emphasized
in  the  new theories  of trade  and  growth  take  place mostly  in  the  production  of
advanced  manufactured  products,  such as high-technology goods.  However,  if a
country  is  "lagging  behind"  technologically  and  has  an  initial  comparative
advantage  in  "non-dynamicn  sectors,  openness to trade  can  reduce the growth
rate  (Matsuyama  (1992)).  Indeed,  exports  of many developing countries continue
to  consist  of  raw  materials  (including  energy  and  agricultural  products)  and
relatively  low-technology  manufactured  goods  (such  as  textiles).  Even  though
6See Winters (2002) for a detailed discussion of the linkages between trade policies and the
poverty.
9openness  to  trade  (and  capital  flows)  may  help  these  countries  to  assimilate
technologies and production  techniques over time  (thereby  enabling  them to shift
eventually toward the production of goods and services that are characterized by
dynamic gains) there may again be a 'transition  period"  during which globalization
may have only a  limited effect  (if at all) on  growth  and  poverty.  It has  also been
argued that opening an economy to trade may discourage domestic research and
development  activities, for  instance  by  inducing  the  poorer  countries  to  allocate
too much of their limited supply of skilled labor to the production  of manufactured
goods.  In such  conditions,  paradoxically,  restrictions  on  trade  may  accelerate
growth.
Trade  liberalization  may also lead to higher  poverty by reducing the demand
for unskilled  labor  and  worsening  income  distribution.  In a  number  of countries
(particularly in  Latin America), openness to trade during the 1980s and 1990s has
coincided  with  an  increase  in  the  demand  of,  and  the  return  to,  skilled  labor
relative to unskilled labor,  and a worsening of income distribution.  An explanation
of  this  phenomenon  is  that  trade  liberalization  has  been  associated  with  the
introduction of higher-level technology, the use of which requires skilled labor. The
reason  is that the cost of (imported)  capital depends  not only on the relative price
of capital goods but also on tariffs that are  incurred  in purchasing  a unit of capital
goods abroad.  To the extent that a fall in tariffs translates  into a fall  in the cost of
capital  (as  the  evidence  suggests),  a  high  degree  of complementarity  between
skilled  labor and  capital,  and  a  high  degree  of substitutability  between  unskilled
labor and capital, would indeed entail an increase in the demand for skilled labor--
thereby  leading  to  a widening  of  the  wage  gap  between  skilled  and  unskilled
labor.7 The  reduction  in the demand for unskilled labor may translate  into  higher
unemployment for that category of labor and  increased poverty.  Moreover,  in the
presence  of imperfect  credit  markets  (and  following  the  logic of Galor  and  Zeira
(1993)),  the worsening  of income distribution  may  hamper the ability of unskilled
10workers to pledge collateral and borrow to finance the acquisition of skills, thereby
making an escape from the "poverty trap"  more  difficult. There  is strong empirical
evidence  suggesting  that,  indeed,  human  capital  accumulation  in developing
countries is subject tb credit market imperfections.
The link between trade  openness and the accumulation  of human  capital is
important to understand the long-run effects of globalization on poverty.  Do open
trade  regimes lead to high  investment in human  capital in developing countries?
Some theoretical models actually predict that free trade may lead to a decrease in
the  accumulation  of  human  capital  in  countries  that  are  initially  skills-scarce.
Findlay  and  Kierzkowski  (1983),  for  instance,  using  a model  in  which  capital
markets are perfect, showed that the accumulation of human capital (and  thus the
supply  of skilled  labor)  in countries that  are  initially  skills-scarce falls when the
rewards  to education  are  reduced  by the  availability  of cheaper,  skills-intensive
import goods. By contrast, Cartiglia (1997) showed that trade may actually reduce
initial differences in supplies of human capital. A key element of his analysis is the
assumption  that  credit  constraints  (as  mentioned  earlier)  limit  the  ability  of
unskilled workers  to finance  the  education  needed  to  become  skilled.  In such
conditions,  capital  market  imperfections  affect  the  pattem  of  comparative
advantage  and  the  impact  of trade  liberalization.  Because  the  argument  is, I
think, quite relevant for assessing  the  link between  globalization  and  poverty in
developing countries, it  is worth reviewing it in  some detail.8
To  begin  with,  consider  a two-sector  small  open  economy  in which  all
workers  (skilled  and  unskilled)  live  two  periods.  Two  tradable  goods  are
produced: a "high-tech"  good  and a "low-tech"  good  (denoted  by the subscripts H
and  L, respectively).  Production  of the  H good,  YH,  requires  both  capital  and
7For instance,  Beyer,  Rojas, and  Vergara  (1999)  found  that trade  openness,  as measured
by  the volume of trade  over GDP,  widened the -wage gap  between  skilled and  unskilled labor in
Chile.
8Galor and Zeira  (1996) present an altemative framework  in which trade  liberalization, by
increasing  the  relative  price  of goods produced  by skilled  workers,  affects  the  return  to human
capital.skilled  labor (in quantities  KH  and  SH,  respectively), whereas  production  of the L
good,  YL,  requires  capital  and  unskilled  labor  (in  quantities  KL  and  U,
respectively).  Assuming  the  same  Cobb-Douglas  technology  in  both  sectors,
production is given by
YH  = KaHSH,  O  < a< 1,  (1)
YL  =KLU  ,  (2)
with the (constant) total stock of capital given by
K  = KH+KL.  (3)
Let z denote the relative price of the H-good in  terms of the L-good; because
both goods are tradable, z is given on world  markets. Assuming perfect mobility of
capital  across  sectors  and  perfect competition,  the  rates  of return  on  capital  in
each sector (that is,  the marginal  product of capital) must be equal:
aa-I  Ul-  = zaKlSH  a  = r.  (4)
Using (3)  and (4), the equilibrium value of KH is thus
K/u KH =  l/U+Zl/(a-l)/SH
Wages  of  skilled  and  unskilled  workers,  ws  and  wu  respectively,  are
determined  from  (1) and  (2)  by  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor.  Using  the
resulting expressions and (4), it  can be established that
ws  =  ia[  +Z  1 /(
1 a)  U
r1a2L-T K  (5)
12Thus,  for z  and  the  composition  of the  labor  force  (SH  and  U) given, the
composition of production and factor retums are uniquely determined.
As  noted  above,  each  Individual  lives  two periods.  In the first  period,  the
individual can either go to school or work as an  unskilled worker.  Individuals who
go  to school  in the first period  of their life work  as skilled  labor  in the second
period; the others remain unskilled. At the end of the second period, all individuals
die  and  have  one  child.  There  is  no  population  growth,  and  the  size  of each
generation is normalized to one. At every point in time, one young generation and
one old generation are  alive, so that the total size of the population  is 2. In what
follows, let et e  (0,1) denote the proportion of (unskilled) individuals born in period
t who go to school in period  t.
Within  each  generation,  individuals  differ  in  the  ownership  of  capital.,
Specifically, the  distribution of capital  within  each generation  is assumed  to be
constant over time and distributed  uniformly over the interval (km  = a + X  + t, km  :
b +  ,-t):
n(k,) = n(k,; a, b,v, t) =  Ikm,kM(kS),
where t 2 0, 'u  Z 0, a Z 0, b > a+2t and b > 0.  The richest individuals own  km = b +
u - t units of capital, whereas the poorest own km  = a + Mo  + t units. Thus, of course
kM - km = b - a - 2t, which  is positive given the restriction imposed  on b. Let n(k8)'
denote the number of individuals who own ks units of capital.
The number of individuals in each generation is
- f2  J km=btv-tdks = 1,
b t  k=a++t
13whereas the total stock of capital owned by each generation is
|kM=  + t ksdks =  a+b+2v)
b-a-21  t  av  2'
so that
K= a+b+2v.  (6)
Thus, because in every period the total size of the population is 2, the size of
the aggregate capital stock is a + b + 2u.
The  number  of individuals  in  each generation  whose  stock of  capital  is  at
least as large as q is
nq  = 1-  fq  k-dks  = 2 flqi  b--a-2t  k,,Fa+v+t  b--a-2t  (7)
A quantity SE of skilled workers  are used to educate those individuals et who
go  to  school  in  each  period.  Suppose,  for  simplicity,  that  the  "production"  of
education is linear:
SEt = yet.  (8)
The  supply  of  skilled  workers  at  t  is therefore  equal  to  the  number  of
individuals  who  went  to  school  in the  previous  period,  et-,,  and  is allocated
between teachers and production of the H-good:
St = e-,l  = SHt+ SEt,  (9)
which implies that, using (8):
14SHf  = e,-i - yet.  (10)
The supply of unskilled workers at t is the sum of those who  chose not to go
to school in the previous  period, 1-et,,, and those who opted not to go to school in
the current period:
Ut = 2 - et, l-  et.  (1
In the steady state, the number of individuals who  become educated  is the
same in every generation (et = e); thus, equations (8) to (11)  imply
SE = ye,  SH = (1 -y)e,  S = e.  (12)
U = 2(1 - e).  (13)
Suppose that the price of the H-good is high enough to ensure that the wage
differential  between  wu  and  ws  is  such  that  all  individuals  would  prefer  to  be
skilled, but that at the same time  imperfections of the credit market (again, along
the  lines of Galor and  Zeira  (1993))  are such that the ability to invest  in  human
capital in the first period of life depends on  inherited wealth.  Specifically, suppose
that individual i will be able to attend school only if the income that he derives from
its own capital, rk1, is as least as large as the cost of tuition, given by the wage of
a (skilled) teacher,  ws,  multiplied by the teacher-students ratio, y.  That is,
rki > yws.
Then, setting q = ywslr and nq  = e in (7)  yields
15e-  =b+v-t-y  (wslr)
b-a-2t  (14)
This equation gives the number of individuals in each generation that will be
able to attend school, as a linear function of wslr. Inverting it yields
- b+u-t  (b-a-2t) e  (15)
r  (15r
Substituting the steady-state  values of SH  and  U from  (12)  and  (13)  in (5)
and using (6)  yields
- _  . (1-y)e  +z-l/(l-a)  2(1-e)  -1
r  - a  a+b+2v  a+b+2v  (16)
Equations  (15)  and  (16)  are two  steady-state  relations  between e and  w3Ir
that  determine  the  long-run  general  equilibrium  of  the  economy.  An  interior
solution is  obtained  for 0 <  e <  1;  otherwise,  the economy  either has no  skilled
labor and is specialized in the production of the L-good, or has only skilled labor
and is  specialized in  the production of the H-good (e  = 1).
To  examine  the  effect  of  trade  openness  in this  setting,  consider  an
economy  that  is initially  skills-scarce  and  whose  comparative  advantage  in
autarky  (or  prior  to liberalization)  is in the  production  of the  L-good.  When  the
economy is opened,  the price of the H-good falls, and thus z falls as well. This, in
tum,  leads  to a reduction in ws,  the  return to the factor specific to the H-sector.
The  (equilibrium)  number  of  individuals who  attend  school  therefore  increases.
The  reason is that when the price of the H-good falls, the wage of skilled workers
falls  as well,  both  because  of the  direct effect of the price change and  because
capital  tends  to  move  toward  the  L-good  sector.  Trade  openness  makes
employment  in the  production  of the  H-good  less profitable  and  induces skilled
workers to switch  away from  production and  into teaching;  the fall in the cost of
education  that  the  reduction  in ws entails  makes  credit constraints  less  binding
16and  more  people  can  afford  education.  The  supply  of  skilled  labor  therefore
increases in equilibrium.
The opposite happens  in a country whose initial endowment of skilled labor
is high  and whose  comparative  advantage,  prior  to openness,  is  in  the H-good.
Trade  increases  the  price of the  H-good  and  induces skilled  workers  to switch
from teaching  toward  production  of the H-good.  z rises and trade  liberalization is
associated with an  increase in the demand for skilled labor relative to the demand
for unskilled  labor;  the  wage  differential  between  labor  categories  widens.  The
cost of education  rises and  a smaller  number of (unskilled) individuals are able to
afford  it. Put differently, trade  liberalization  increases the rewards  of education  in
countries  that  are  skills-abundant  to  begin  with,  and  reduces  the  reward  to
education  in  countries that are skills-scarce initially. Capital  market imperfections
hinder  the  accumulation  of  human  capital  because  the  cost  of  education  is  a
binding  constraint.  In initially  skills-scarce  countries,  trade  liberalization  eases
financing constraints (because the cost of education falls as ws falls) and induces
an increase in the accumulation of skills.9
Thus,  in the presence of capital market imperfections that affect the ability of
workers  to  borrow  and  invest in  human  capital, the impact  of trade  liberalization
depends crucially on initial conditions, namely, the country's endowment  of skilled
labor.  Suppose that one is considering a country characterized  by a comparative
advantage  in  the  production  of the  L-good  prior  to  trade  liberalization  (a  fairly
reasonable  assumption  for  many  low-income  countries);  does  the  model  imply
that poverty would fall  as a  result of trade openness?  If one takes  the  unskilled
wage  as  a measure  of the  poverty  line  and the  ratio of unskilled workers  to the
total number of workers  as an approximation to the "headcount"  poverty index, the
answer is yes.  But if the  poverty line  is exogenous  and the behavior of wages in
the aftermath  of liberalization  is taken  into account, the answer is ambiguous, for
17two  reasons. First,  although the number of skilled workers rises, their wage falls.
Second,  as  a result  of gross  complementarty  between  factors,  physical  capital
used in  the production of the H-good rises (as  can be inferred from (1)) and falls in
the L-sector; thus, although the fall in the supply of unskilled workers tends to put
upward pressure on wages for that category of labor, the fall in the capital stock in
the  L-sector  exerts  an  opposite  effect,  because  of  its  impact  on  the  marginal
productivity of labor in that sector (as can  be inferred from  (2)); thus, whether  wu
goes up or down cannot be established a prior.10 As a result, one cannot say for
sure whether poverty rises or falls--it all depends on where the poverty line stands
with respect to the initial and post-liberalization  levels of the unskilled wage.  The
point,  nevertheless,  is  that  poverty  may  increase,  as  a  result  of the  interplay
between  trade openness,  the incentives that changes in factor retums  create to
accumulate  human  capital,  and  the  borrowing  constraints  that  individuals  may
face on the credit market when seeking to finance the acquisition of skills.
2. Financial Integration
As  noted  earlier,  although  intemational  financial  market  integration  may
bring  significant  benefits in the  long  term  (and  there  is  indeed  some  evidence
suggesting that this is the case), it is increasingly recognized that a high degree of
financial openness may entail significant short-term  costs as well. The magnitude
of the  capital flows  recorded  by some  developing countries  in  recent years  and
the  abrupt  reversals  that  such  flows  have  displayed  at  times  have  been
associated with deep financial instability, economic crises and  sharp increases in
poverty  rates-particularly  in  countries  with  imprudent  sovereign  debt
management,  improperly  sequenced  capital  account  liberalization,  and  poorly
9Kim  and  Kim  (2000) argued  that education (or what they called 'general"  human  capital)
may also help to  increase the degree  of mobility of workers across sectors, thereby aftenuabng the
costs of trade reform  (including a  short-run  increase in  poverty) and raising growth rates.
l0Moreover,  note  that the  fact that  the supply of skilled  labor  increases  in the  model  is
entirely due to the assumpton that the cost of education is proportional to wu; if one assumes that
tuition costs are exogenous, then  the credit  constraint would  not change, possibly leading to no
change in the equilibrium  number of skilled workers.
18regulated  domestic financial  systems. The  recent crisis in East Asia  is a case in
point (see, for instance, Horton and Mazumdar  (2001)).
A  key problem  associated  with  financial openness  is that  access to  world
capital  markets  tends  to  be  asymmetric. Many  developing  countries  (including
some  of  the  richer  ones)  are  able  to  borrow  on  world  capital  markets  only  in
"good"  times,  whereas in "bad"  times they tend to face credit constraints.  Access
is  thus  pro-cyclical.  Clearly,  in such  conditions,  one  of the  alleged  benefits  of
accessing world  capital markets  (the ability to borrow to smooth  consumption  in
the face of temporary adverse shocks), is nothing but a fiction. Pro-cyclicality may,
in fact,  have a perverse  effect and  increase macroeconomic  instability  (see,  for
instance,  Ag6nor  (2001)  and  Dadush,  Dasgupta,  and  Ratha  (2000)):  favorable
shocks  may  attract  large  capital  inflows  and  encourage  consumption  and
spending at levels that are  unsustainable in the longer term, forcing  countries to
over-adjust to adverse  shocks as a result of abrupt capital reversals.  The  impact
on poverty may thus be magnified.
In recent  years,  financial  globalization  in many  transition  and  developing
economies  has  taken  the form  of greater penetration  of the  domestic financial
system by foreign banks.  Unlike trade liberalization, which has often resulted from
unilateral  decisions  by  govemments  to  lower  tariffs,  this  form  of  financial
integration  has often been less a matter of choice than a decision imposed by the
country's  situation-in  several  cases,  the need  to recapitalize  domestic  banks in
the  aftermath  of  a banking  crisis  (see  Ag6nor  (2001)).  Although  there  are
potentially  large  benefits  associated  with  greater  foreign  penetration  (such  as
enhanced  quality of financial services,  better techniques  for credit analysis,  and
reduced  risks  of  domestic  financial  instability),  which  may  translate  into  higher
growth  rates and  lower poverty, there are potentially adverse effects as well. Most
importantly  for  the  issue  at  stake,  to  the  extent  that  foreign  penetration  is
accompanied  by  a  greater  concentration  of  credit  flows  toward  large  firms
producing tradables, and reduced access to loans by small and medium-size firms
19(which tend  to  be more  labor intensive than larger ones),  it may lead  to  reduced
levels of economic- activity,  lower  demand  for  labor,  and  possibly  to  a  greater
incidence  of  poverty.  Evidence  on  this  issue  is  still  rather  tenuous,  but  the
possibility cannot be dismissed.
Another channel  through  which  financial  openness  may  have  an  adverse
effect on  the  poor (at  least  in  the short  run)  is the credit  market.  As  argued  by
Agenor  and  Aizenman  (1998,  1999)-in  a  framework  that  emphasizes  the  links
between  capital flows,  the financial system,  and the supply side of the economy,
as well as the costly state verification  approach  pioneered  by Townsend  (1979)-
the  increased  exposure  to  volatile  shocks  that  is  associated  with  financial
openness  may  translate  into  higher  domestic  interest  rates  (because  of  the
increased  risk of default),  lower domestic output, and thus possibly higher poverty
rates.  The  key  reason  is  that  increased  volatility  (of  world  interest  rates,  in
particular)  raises  expected  intermediation  costs  and  lead  domestic  financial
institutions  (whose  ability to enforce  loan contracts  is limited) to  either increase
domestic  interest  rates or to ration credit to maintain  expected  profits. Of course,
what this argument  implies is that financial integration should  be accompanied  by
adequate reforms of the domestic financial system to minimize the adverse effects
of volatility on output,  employment,  and poverty--not that financial  openness per
se is undesirable.
But in addition to level effects associated with greater exposure to volatility, it
has  been  argued  that  financial  openness  may  also  have  adverse  effects  on
growth  and,  through  that channel,  on poverty.  In  particular,  Devereux and  Smith
(1994) studied the effects of intemational risk sharing (portfolio diversification) in a
multi-country world  in  which growth  is based  upon the spillover effects of human
capital accumulation. They showed that when countries share endowment risk via
international  capital  markets,  the saving  and growth  rates  can  be lower than in
autarky.  How they arrive at this conclusion is worth examining in more detail.
20Consider  a world  consisting  of N countries,  each  of them  with  a -stationary
population.  All  countries  produce  a  single homogeneous  good,  and  there  is  an
infinitely-lived,  representative  agent  with  constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA)
preferences, given by
Eo  t_  - 1, 2,  ..  *N.
Production technology is also identical across  countries. Specifically, output
y't is given by
yit = Ok  (Hitxit)
where kit is the firm's capital stock (and  also country Is investment at t, assuming
full depreciation within  a  period),  Hit the stock of knowledge  (or human  capital),
and  xjt hours  (supplied  inelastically).  In equilibrium,  Hit = Kit  (the economy-wide
capital  stock),  so  that  there  are  aggregate  constant  returns  to scale  in  capital
alone.
Each  country  faces  idiosyncratic  income  risk  but  there  is  no  aggregate
uncertainty at the world  level.  More  formally,  there  is a  country-specific,  random
income  shock,  eSt,  which  is  assumed  to  be  proportional  to  the  economy-wide
capital stock in each country:
£it =  y,tK#,
where the distribution of the yit is assumed to be  such that each country faces a
zero-mean,  i.i.d.  process  for its  income  risk over  time  and  the aggregate  world
N
shock is zero in a symmetric equilibrium  E=I  Yi:  =  0
21Agents  choose  consumption,  investment,  and  asset  holdings to  maximize
lifetime  utility.  Under  "financial  autarkyr,  there  are  no  markets  that  allow  for
intemational  diversification  of country-specific  risk,  and  thus  no  trade  in  (state-
contingent) assets between countries.  Domestic saving must therefore be equal to
domestic  investment.  Devereux and  Smith show that the growth rate in this case,
A
git  ,is  a random variable and is given by
g't = o(19 + y;t),  1  =a [flaOEt(0+ yjt+i)-f] l/  (17)
where ¢ can be shown to be a time-invariant function of the distribution of y. This
expression shows that,  because of the assumption of CRRA  preferences  (which
implies  positive  third-order  derivatives),  an  increase  in  country-specific  income
risk  (as  measured  by  a  mean-preserving  spread  in  the  distribution  of  y,)  will
increase  the  economy's  (average)  growth  rate  through  its  positive  impact  on
savings (which equals investment under autarky).
By  contrast,  under  "financial  openness",  there  are  complete  intemational
markets for risk sharing; with no aggregate  uncertainty, this completeness allows
agents in each country to fully diversify country-specific risk. Devereux and Smith
show that the growth  rate in this case is non-stochastic and given by
g  =  t  a  (faOlo)Ie  (18)
The  expression  in (18)  is similar to (17),  except that the  y distribution  does
not  appear."'  By  eliminating  country-specific  income  risk,  financial  market
integration  eliminates  the  impact  of  this  risk  on  savings,  and  therefore  on
economic  growth.  A comparison  of (17)  and  (18) shows  indeed that the average
growth  rate  is  lower  under  openness,  because  the  elimination  of  income  risk
reduces world savings. Put differently,  equilibrium growth  rates in all countries are
iiNote that to ensure positive growth requires imposing qO > 1.
22lower  under  financial  openness.  The  reason  is  that,  as  indicated  above,  with
CRRA  preferences  riskier  income  leads  to  greater  saving  as  a  result  of  a
precautionary  motive.  With  full  risk  sharing,  income  risk  is  diversified  away,
reducing the equilibrium  savings rate  in each country. Lower  saving in tum tends
to lower the growth rate in each country.'2
As shown  by Devereux and  Smith, the above result also holds  if, instead of
income-specific  risk,  countries  differ  in  that  they  face  specific  productivity
disturbances,  Bit,  provided  that  the  distribution  of  productivity  shocks  satisfies
again  a  "no  aggregate  uncertainty"  condition  and  that a  >  1 (the  most  relevant
case empirically).1 3 However,  it  is sensitive  to the assumption  that there  is  only
one  investment  technology  available.  As  can  be  inferred  from  the  results  of
Greenwood  and  Jovanovich (1990)  and Obsffeld  (1994),  if there  are many (risky)
technologies available,  financial openness  may  increase  the  equilibrium  growth
rate-even  if  it  reduces  savings  rates,  as  a  result  of  the  precautionary  motive
alluded to eariier-by leading to a reallocation of savings to projects with high risk
and  return.  Similarly, it should  be noted that the above model takes the depth of
the financial  system as given when  assessing the impact of financial integration.
However,  it is  possible that  the two  may  be  positively related  beyond  a  certain
level of income;  in Agenor and Aizenman  (1999),  for instance, financial openness
translates  into  lower  interest  rate  markups  and  more  efficient intermediation  by
domestic  banks.  In  that  case,  intemational  financial  openness  may  bring
additional  benefits,  which  could  mitigate  the  adverse  impact  of  a  greater
opportunity for risk diversification on savings and  growth. The point, nevertheless,
12They also show that If  the gains from risk sharing under openness are more than offset by
the  losses  associated  with  a reduced  growth  rate,  welfare  of each  country  may  be lower than
under financial autarky.
13Note  that  the  assumpbon  of  time-separable,  CRRA  preferences  is  important  for  the
argument but not crucial: as shown by Weil (1990), with generalized iso-elastic preferences that do
not satisfy the  axioms of expected utility and in which risk aversion is distinct from  (the  inverse of)
intertemporal  substitution,  the  response  of  savings  to  risk  would  depend  in sign  only  on
intertemporal  substitution.  Thus,  in the  Devereux-smith  model,  greater  opportunities  for  risk
sharing through intemational financial integrabon  would therefore lead to lower savings and growth
rates if the elasticity of intertemporal  substitution is  less than one  (as is  often the case in practce).
23is that  it  is  possible for financial globalization  to  hurt the poor  (even  in the  long
run), by lowering growth  rates permanently.
2.  Nonlinearities
The  foregoing  discussion  focused  on  the  possibility  of  a  linear,  negative
relationship  between  increased  globalization  and  poverty.  There  are  also,
however,  possible  discontinuities  (or  threshold  effects)  and  other  nonlinearities
that  may  come  into  play  and  alter  the  sign  of  the  relationship  between
globalization and poverty.  Understanding what causes these nonlinearities (which
have  seldom  been  acknowledged  in  the  debate  on  the  benefits  and  costs  of
globalization) is important not only from an analytical standpoint but also from the
perspective of empirical analysis.
Consider the following example, which  is described in more  detail in Agenor
(2002b).14 Suppose that trade liberalization has two types of effects. The first is an
output effect, which translates into an  increase in income  per capita  (as  a  result,
for  instance,  of  improved  efficiency  in  the  allocation  of  domestic  resources).
Suppose also that, in  line with the evidence  provided by Greenaway,  Morgan  and
Wright  (2002),  this effect  has  a J-curve shape:  at first,  output falls  (as  output in
import-competing  industries  drops)  and  then  increases  gradually  (as  the
exportables  sector  expands).  Assuming  for  simplicity  a  one-to-one,  inverse
relationship  between  income  and  poverty,  this  implies that  globalization  has  an
inverted J-curve effect on poverty.
The  second effect of trade  liberalization  is a relative  wage  effect,  which is
also assumed  to be non-monotonic.  Specifically, suppose that at first, the skilled-
unskilled wage differential  increases with openness  (as  documented  by Harrison
and  Hanson  (1999),  for  instance),  possibly  because  imports  of  capital  goods
24increase  and  firms  substitute  away  from  unskilled  labor.  Employment  of  that
category of labor falls initially and  poverty tends to increase. Over time,  however,
the initial widening  in wage differentials  may lead to investment in human  capital
and a gradual  increase in the supply of skilled labor; this would tend to narrow the
wage differential across skill categories,  and higher degrees  of liberalization  may
reduce poverty. This second effect may thus take the form of an inverted  U-shape
relation--which  would depend,  for instance,  on  whether there exists a  subsidy to
skills acquisition or not.
It  is  intuitively easy to  see that,  with  both  effects  being  nonlinear,  multiple
equilibria  may emerge.  However,  for the purpose  at hand,  what  is  important to
note  is  that  the  initial  and  longer-run  effects  of trade  liberalization  on  poverty,
operating  either through  output or relative wages, differ  in sign: although  poverty
may rise in the short run,  as output increases  and investment in  education  rises,
poverty  begins to fall. Thus,  not only does  the sign  of the relationship  between
globalization  and  poverty  vary  over  time,  the  absolute  value  of  the  elasticity
between  these two  variables is also not constant.  Moreover,  discontinuities  may
appear:  the  initial  widening  of  the  wage  differential,  for  instance,  may  not  be
sufficiently large  to  translate  into  strong  incentives to  invest  in  skills;  beyond  a
certain threshold; however, the impact.of the wage differential on the propensity to
acquire  human capital may change  in a discrete fashion and  may trigger a large
increase  in  the  supply  of  skilled  labor.  These  discontinuities  could  lead,  for
instance,  to  a  piece-wise  linear  relationship  between  globalization  and  poverty.
Similar arguments can readily be developed to argue in favor of the existence of a
nonlinear  relationship  between  financial  integration  and  poverty--as  can  be
inferred, for instance,  from the "threshold"  effect, on the volatility of world  interest
rates discussed  by Ag6nor and  Aizenman  (1999)  in their  analysis of the welfare
benefits and costs of financial integration.
14  See  for instance  Albuquerque  and  Rebelo  (2000)  for another  example of the  nonlinear
effect of trade  reform. Their focus,  however, is on changes  in the industrial structure,  rather than
unemployment and poverty.
25.The thrust of the foregoing discussion  is thus twofold.  First,  although there
are solid analytical arguments to suggest that globalization may improve the plight
of  the  poor  (in  high-  and  low-income  countries  alike),  there  are  also  equally-
convincing  reasons  (at  least to  me)  to  suggest  that the  poor may  not,  after  all,
benefit  much  from  trade  and  financial  integration-at  least  without  significant
govemment  interference. Assessing the net effects of globalization  on the poor is
therefore  not  a  matter  of faith,  but  rather an  empirical  issue.  Second,  there  are
important  nonlinearties  that  may  emerge  in  assessing  the  link  between
globalization  and  poverty.  These  nonlinearities  are  not  mere  theoretical
curiosities; on the contrary, it can plausibly be argued that they may be very much
at  play in  the  real  world.  Ignoring  them  may  seriously  hamper  the  reliability of
empirical results and may lead to misleading conclusions.
Ill.  METHODOLOGY
To assess the relationship between  globalization and poverty I use a cross-
country  regression  framework,  using  unbalanced  panel  data  for  a  group  of
developing countries for which I was able to collect sufficient data. The dependent
variable  is  the  poverty  rate  (POV),  measured  by  the  headcount  index  for  the
population as a whole.  In addition to measures of trade and financial integration,  I
include two sets of "control'  variables, based  on my previous results  (see Agenor
(2002a)):  macroeconomic variables and structural indicators.  Specifically, The set
of explanatory variables used in the regressions are the following (see Appendix A
for more  precise definitions):
INFLTAX is the inflation tax rate, defined as the ratio of the inflation  rate over
one  plus the  inflation  rate.  This  variable  is  conveniently bounded  between  zero
and implies a concave relation between poverty and the inflation rate;
26TRANSGDP  is the  ratio of total  subsidies  and other  current transfers  over
GDP,  which aims  at capturing the level effects associated with  changes in  public
spending;
LITY is the youth literacy rate  in percent of the population aged 15-24, which
aims to capture the level of education of the labor force;
LHOSPITAL  is the log of hospital beds per 1,000 persons, which measures
overall health conditions;
GDPPC is GDP  per capita at PPP exchange  rates, which captures the level
of economic development;
REALGR  is the  annual  growth  rate  of GDP  per  capita,  measured  at PPP
exchange  rates,  which can be viewed  as either a proxy for the rate of return  on
physical investment, or as a measure of cyclical movements in output;
REALEX  is  the  annual  rate of  change  of the  real  effective  exchange  rate
(defined such that an increase is a depreciation);
CTOT is the percentage change in the terms of trade;
VREALXL  is a measure of macroeconomic volatility, which consists of rolling
standard  deviations of the real exchange rate.
I have  discussed  at  length  elsewhere  the  rationale  for considering  these
variables (see Ag6nor (2002a,  2002b)),  so only a brief justification is offered here.
The  inflation  tax  (which  is  levied  on  non-indexed  assets,  such  as  currency
holdings)  is expected  to have a  positive effect on  poverty. Current transfers as a
proportion  of GDP  has a  priori an ambiguous effect. The effect  of an across-the-
board cut in transfers,  for instance, may be to raise poverty;  but to the extent that
27it is accompanied  by better targeting, poverty may fall. An  increase in the literacy
rate and an improvement  in health  (as measured  by an increase in the number of
hospital beds),  are expected to reduce poverty.  Both  the level of GDP  per capita
and  its  rate  of  growth  are  also  expected  to  be  negatively  correlated  with  the
poverty  rate.  The  effect  of  a  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  is  in  general
ambiguous;  it may lead  to a reduction  in poverty if it benefits small farmers  in the
tradable sector (as  is the case in many low-income developing countries), but if at
the  same time it  brings about a significant increase  in  the cost-of-living  index  in
urban areas, overall  poverty may increase. An  improvement  in the terms of trade
tends  to  reduce  poverty  if  it  represents  an  increase  in  the  relative  price  of
agricultural  commodities  (thereby benefiting  small farmers  in -rural areas)  or a fall
in  the  price  of  imported  consumption  goods  (benefiting  mostly  households  in
urban  areas).  At the  same time,  however,  a  rise  in  import  prices  may  have  an
adverse  supply-side  effect  (because  it  raises  the  price  of imported  inputs)  and
may  lower  output,  employment,  and  real  wages,  thereby  increasing  poverty.
Finally, an increase  in macroeconomic volatility (as  measured  by greater volatility
of the  real  exchange  rate)  is  expected  to  increase  poverty,  possibly through  its
adverse effect on investment and the propensity to save.
To  measure  globalization,  even  narrowly  defined  (as  is  the  case  in  this
study) to focus on trade and financial integration, is an arduous task. In particular,
it is difficult to find an adequate measure of trade openness--which  should ideally
measure  how open markets are to foreign competition.  Proxies for openness that
have  been  used  include  tariffs,  nontariff  barriers,  effective  rates  of  protection,
trade  liberalization,  relative  prices,  import  penetration,  export  intensity,  and
deviations of actual from  predicted trade flows or volumes  (see  Edwards  (1998),
Harrison (1996), Harrison and  Hanson (1999),  and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999)).
Here, to measure trade globalization, I use two indicators:
28OPEN,  the ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and services in
percent of  GDP  (referred  to  in  what follows  as the  "trade  openness  indicator"),
which aims to capture exposure to extemal shocks;
TARIFF,  the  average  tariff  rate  (that  is, total  tariff  revenue  divided  by  the
value of imports).
The most common  approach to examine the impact of financial openness in
cross-country  studies  is to  build  an  index  of capital  account  restrictions  on the
basis  of  the  qualitative  information  reported  in  the  IMF's  Annual  Report  on
Exchange Arrangements  and Restrictions.15 The trouble with this approach is that
it provides  no clue regarding the intensity of capital  restrictions--or, inversely, the
effective degree  of capital account  liberalization.  Here,  I chose a  different  route
and opted for an "effective"  measure of financial globalization,  the ratio  of foreign
direct investment flows (FDI)  to GDP.  16
If trade  openness  lowers  poverty,  the first variable should  have a negative
coefficient,  whereas  the  second  should  have  a positive  coefficient.  Similarly,  if
financial integration reduces poverty, the FDI-to-GDP  ratio should have a negative
coefficient in the estimated regression.
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  at  the  outset  that  all  three  of  the  above
measures  of globalization  are  problematic,  because they capture  only  indirectly
the  process  of trade  and  financial openness.  For  instance, the  trade  openness
15For  instance, in  their study on capital flows to transition economies, Garibaldi et al.  (2002)
constructed  indices  of  restrictions  on  foreign  direct  investment  and  portfolio  investment.  The
categories covered  in the first index are approval requirements, the extent to which profits can be
remitted  abroad,  ease  in liquidating  assets,  and  whether or  not  direct  investment  benefits  from
preferential treatment.
16A  complementary  measure  of  financial  globalization,  in  light  of  the  growing  inter-
nationalization  of banking, would  be the share of assets of the domestic financial system  held  by
foreign  banks.  However,  using  the  Bankscope  database,  I  was  unable  to  obtain  sufficient
observations to include It in the regressions. Yet another approach would be to use the indicator of
intensity of capital controls developed by Edison and  Wamock (2001);  however, their calculations
pertain mostly to middle-income countries.
29indicator (being calculated in nominal terms),  is sensitive to short-run  fluctuations
in world  commodity  prices,  whereas  the  average  effective  tariff  rate  does  not
capture non-tariff barriers--information  on which is highly unreliable.  Similarly, the
ratio  of  FDI  to  GDP  may  show  large  fluctuations  in specific  years,  reflecting
specific operations,  such  as  the  privatization  of a large  public  enterprise.  To
mitigate  or "smooth  out"  the  impact of year-on-year fluctuations in terms-of-trade
changes on extemal openness and year-on-year fluctuations in FDI flows, I use in
the regressions  below averages over two and three years,  in addition to the one-
year lagged  value.  I suspect that the  "smoothing"  effect associated with a three-
year  average  may  be  excessive  and  impart  some  bias  in  assessing  the
relationship  between  globalization  indicators  and  poverty;  nonetheless,  I will
report them for comparative purposes.
In addition  to  the  problem  of  finding  adequate  indicators  of  trade  and
financial openness,  there  is a major  data  constraint relative to poverty rates and
some  of the other control variables defined  earlier.  I first started  by compiling all
the  data  on  developing  countries  available  on  the  poverty  headcount  index
contained  in the World  Bank  Live Database  (LDB),  which  cover the period  from
the late  1980s to the late  1990s.  This gives a sample of 57 countries, and  a total
number  of  observations  equal  to,  at  most,  91.17  However,  due  to  the  lack  of
available data  on  some  of the control  variables  or globalization  indicators  (most
notably government  transfers  as a share of GDP,  average tariffs, and  FDI),  the
"actual"  sample size is at most 52 observations  (for a total of 31  countries) in the
initial  set of  regressions.  After  excluding the  countries for which  the  number  of
observations  is equal  to  one  (Algeria,  Brazil,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Ghana,  Haiti,
Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Malaysia,  Mauritius,  Nicaragua,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,
Paraguay,  Rwanda,  Venezuela,  Zimbabwe);  I  end  up  with  a sample  of  11
countries  and  at  most  30  observations--6  countries  for  which  the  number  of
17As  is well  known,  there  are  serious conceptual  and  practical  issues associated  with the
measurement  of  poverty,  and  the  use  of  an  'international  poverty  line"  for  cross-country
comparisons  (see,  for instance,  Deaton  (2001)).  I will return  to these measurement  Issues  in the
concluding section.
30observations  is  equal  to  two  (Colombia,  Dominican  Republic,  India,  Jordan,
Thailand,  Tunisia);  3 for which  the number  of observations  being equal  to three
(Morocco,  Peru,  Sri  Lanka);  one  for which  four  observations  are available  (the
Philippines); and one for which five observations available (Indonesia).
The  estimation method  is OLS with fixed effects. To account for simultaneity
problems with the control varables, which from my previous studies appear to be
particularly  important,  for growth  and  GDP per  capita,  I used  lagged  values  of
these two  variables;  and  as  noted  above,  for  the globalization  indicators  I use
averages over two and three years, in addition to the one-year lagged value.
IV.  PRELIMINARY  EVIDENCE
Table  1 summarizes  some preliminary  results, based  on linear regressions,
for the two measures of trade integration  described earlier. Although  inflation has
the correct (positive) sign in all cases, it is not significant. Changes in the terms of
trade also have no significant effect on poverty when the trade openness indicator
is used, but it does appear to raise significantly the poverty rate when the average
tariff rate  is used  as a measure of 'real'  globalization. An increase in the share  of
transfers  to  GDP  is  negatively  associated  with  poverty,  but  the  variable  is
significant again only when trade openness is measured by the average tariff rate.
It is difficult to make  much  of the fact that public transfers and subsidies are not
significant  in the first  set of regressions;  the reason  is that the variable  does not
measure  very well  what  are  the subsidies and  transfers  that  actually go to  the
poor (it includes, for instance, transfers from the government to private and  public
enterprises).  An increase in the rate of depreciation  of the real exchange rate has
a  strong,  negative  effect  on  poverty  (possibly  because  improvements  in  the
relative  price  of  tradables  benefit  to  a  significant  extent  farmers  producing
exportables in the agricultural sector), whereas an increase in its volatility tends to
31increase  significantly  the  proportion  of the  poor,  as  I found  in  an  earlier  study
using  a broader sample  (see  Agenor (2002a)).  This latter effect may operate,  as
noted  earlier,  through  and  adverse  effect  of  macroeconomic  instability  on  the
propensity to  save and invest. The  literacy rate  has the correct sign and is highly
significant  in all the  regressions  shown  in  the table, whereas  the health indicator
(the  number  of  hospital  beds),  despite  being  correctly  signed  in  all  cases,  is
statistically significant only when the average tariff rate  is used.  Both the  level of
real GDP  per capita and its growth  rate have the expected  negative sign and are
highly significant  in  all  regressions  involving  the average  tariff rate.  By  contrast,
when  trade  integration  is measured  by the openness  indicator,  the  level of  real
GDP  per capita becomes  statistically insignificant, despite the fact that its growth
rate remains highly significant.
Regarding the  measures of globalization,  the ratio  of FDI-to-GDP  does  not
appear  to  be  robustly  correlated  with the  behavior of poverty  across  countries.
Neither  is the trade  openness  indicator,  although  it is significant at a  10 percent
level  when either a one-year lag or a three-year average is used.  By contrast, the
(lagged) average tariff rate has a statistically significant negative effect on poverty,
implying that trade integration  (as measured  by a fall in average tariffs)  increases
poverty--perhaps  through  some  of the  various  channels  identified  earlier.  This
finding is robust to the various ways of averaging the tariff rate.
What should one draw from these results?  As other researchers in the field
have done,  my inclination is to  consider the results  using the average tariff rates
as  more  reliable  than  those  using  the trade  openness  indicator.  I also view  the
results  obtained with either a  one-year  lag  or a  two-year  average as preferable,
because  a three-year  lag  may impart (as noted  earlier) excessive "smoothing"  to
the underlying series.  Thus, one would be tempted to conclude from these results
(and  particularly regressions  (4)  and (5)) that financial openness has  no effect on
poverty,  whereas  trade  integration  appears to  have  an adverse effect.  However,
this  conclusion  would  be  premature;  the  regression  results  shown  in  Table  1
32assume the existence of a linear relationship between globalization and the poor.
But as discussed  earlier,  there are  good  reasons to believe that the relationship
may be nonlinear.
V.  A POVERTY-GLOBALIZATION  LAFFER  CURVE?
To  capture the possibility of a  nonlinear relationship between  globalization
and  poverty,  I proceed  in two  steps.  First,  instead  of using  several independent
indicators as before,  I derive a "composite"  index of globalization (defined in such
a  way  that  an  increase  represents  greater  integration)  by  using  principal
components  analysis.  Second, I introduce the squared  value  of the index  in the
regressions.  In  order to  generate a "poverty-globalization"  Laffer curve  (with  an
inverted  U shape),  the coefficient  of the  linear term  should  be positive, whereas
the coefficient of the squared term should be negative. The peak of the quadratic
equation  would  then  identify the "threshold"  level of globalization  beyond  which
further integration reduces poverty.
1. Principal Components Analysis
One option  to construct a  composite  indicator of globalization  is to extend
the  methodology  used  for  instance  by  Wacziarg  (1998),  and  combine  various
indicators  of  trade  openness  (such  as  those  used  above)  with  measures  of
financial  openness.18 A problem  with  that  approach,  however,  is the difficulty of
defining relative weights in an objective manner.  In this study, I tackle the problem
differently. To derive  a composite  indicator of trade  and financial globalization,  I
use  principal  components  analysis  (PCA).  In  essence,  PCA  aims  to  replace  a
18 NWacziarg  (1998)  developed  an  index  of trade  policy  by combining  several  Indicators,
including  average tariffs and  an indicator of non-tariff barriers.  The weights  used to construct the
33large set of variables by a smaller set that best "summarizes"  the larger set. More
formally,  the  principal  components  display the eigenvalue  decomposition  of the
sample  second  moment  of  a  group  of series.  The  first  principal  component  is
computed as a linear combination of the series in the group with weights given by
the first eigenvector,  and  so on. The  higher the degree  of co-movement  existing
among  the  original  set  of  series,  the  fewer  will  be  the  number  of  principal
components  needed  to  explain  a  large  portion  of  the  variation  of  that  set.
Altematively,  if all n initial series are  perfectly uncorrelated,  it will take n principal
components  to  explain  all of the  variance  in  the  original  series;  no  advantage
would  be gained  by looking at common  factors,  because  none  exists in the first
place.19
In this  study,  I use the  first principal  component  as  a  globalization  index.
That is, using either two  or three of the previously-defined  indicators of trade and
financial openness  (FDI and one minus the tariff rate;  and both variables plus the
trade  openness  indicator),  I use  PCA  to construct  one  series,  the first  principal
component,  that  explains  as  much  of  the  variance  of  the  original  series  as
possible.20 To  see  whether  selecting  only  the  first  principal  component  is
sufficient, I used a simple variant of the scree test-essentially "eyeballing"  a graph
showing the proportion of the total variance (that is, the ratio of the first eigenvalue
to the  sum of all  eigenvalues) that the  component  explains.  Table  2 presents  a
summary  of  the  results,  for  different  lag-averaging  procedures,  and  with  and
without  the  trade  openness  indicator.  The  results  are  based  on  standardized
variables,  to  ensure  that  each  series  has  a  zero  mean  and  a  unit  standard
deviation  (this  standardization  helps  to  ensure  that  all  series  receive  uniform
treatment  and  that  the construction of the principal  component  measures  is  not
combined  index are determined  from a regression  of trade volumes (as a share of GDP)  on these
indicators plus some other determinants.
'9Appendix  B provides a brief technical  discussion of PCA,  as well  as a description of my
calculatons  (which  are  based  on  the  correlation  matrix  of  the  original  matrix,  instead  of the
vanance-covariance matrix).
20  use  one  minus  the tariff rate,  instead  of the tariff rate itself,  in order to ensure that an
increase  in any of the original  series corresponds  to greater  integraton.  I also  performed  all the
calculations reported below with one over the tariff rate and obtained very similar results.
34influenced  disproportionately  by the  series exhibiting the  largest variation).  They
indicate, for instance,  that excluding the trade openness  indicator and for a two-
lag average, the first principal component explains on average almost 72 percent
of the variation  in  the original  set of series.  I therefore  conclude  that the first
principal  component does a good job at 'summarizing"  the information contained
in the original series and can be used as a synthetic measure  of globalization.
2.  Estimation Results
The  results  of both  linear and  nonlinear regressions  with the globalization
index  are  displayed  in  Tables  3  and  4.  In both  tables,  most  of  the  previous
conclusions  regarding  the  control  variables  continue  to  hold.  In  particular,  the
literacy  remains  highly significant.  However,  the  number  of hospital  beds  loses
some of its significance, despite retaining the correct sign in all cases. In addition,
inflation  becomes significant (when  a  two- or three-year  averaging  procedure  is
used) and so does the level of income  per capita-regardless of whether the trade
openness  indicator is used  or  not in  the  original set of series used  to perform
PCA.21 The degree  of significance of the  rate of real exchange  rate  depreciation
varies significantly  between  Table  3 and  4:  in  the first case,  it falls significantly
when the trade openness indicator is included among the series used to calculate
the  first principal  component and  when  a  one-year  lag  is used,  whereas  in  the
second it becomes insignificant, when either a two- or three-year average is used
and the trade openness indicator is excluded.
The  results  shown  in  Table  3  indicate  that globalization  tends  to have  an
adverse  effect  on  poverty,  as shown  indeed  in  Table  1 when  the average  tariff
rate  is  used.  However,  this  is not  the whole  story.  As  shown  in  Table  4,  the
squared  value  of  the  globalization  index  has  a  negative  and  highly  significant
21In Table 4 the  inflation tax rate  and the share of transfers In GDP  were excluded from
some regressions, because they were incorrectly signed and (or) insignificant.
35coefficient,  regardless of whether one  uses the trade  openness  indicator or not,
and  regardless  of the  number  of lags  used  to average  the  original  indicators of
integration.  This  is true,  in  particular,  of what  I am  tempted to  regard  the most
"reliable"  result-the  regression  in which the trade openness indicator  is  included
and  a two-  or three-lag  average  is  used.  Indeed,  these  are  the  regressions  for
which the "best fit" (in the sense of the highest adjusted R-squared or the smallest
standard error of the regression)  is obtained  in Table 4.
The implication  of these  results  are clear:  Given that the  linear term  has  a
positive  coefficient,  and  the  quadratic  term  a  negative  one,  poverty  at  first
increases when  the index of globalization  rises from  low to moderate  levels,  and
falls once globalization  increases beyond a certain point.  Put differently,  although
globalization  at  low  levels  may  increase  poverty,  it  may  actually  reduce  it  very
significantly at higher levels.
1. Some Additional Sensitivity Tests
To assess the sensitivity of the previous  results (in  addition to the standard
diagnostic tests reported  in the  tables), I performed  two  exercises. First,  I used  a
ratio  of  0.6  for  the  proportion  of  variance  explained  by  the  first  principal
component as a cut-off point for including a country in the regressions. The results
obtained  (available  upon  request)  very  virtually  identical  to  those  reported  in
Tables  3  and 4.  But of course,  given the smaller  sample  size,  these  results  are
less efficient.
It  may  also be  argued  that,  in  line with  the  previous analytical discussion,
globalization may have an  indirect effect on  poverty by a) raising the growth  rate
of output and the level of income per capita; b)  by strengthening  macroeconomic
discipline, thereby  leading  to lower  inflation  and variability  in  the  real exchange
rate.  In an  attempt  to  account  for  these  indirect  effects,  I  used  a two-step
procedure.  I first "purged"  inflation, the level of income per capita, the  growth rate
36of real  GDP,  and the index of real exchange  rate volatility by regressing them on
the  globalization  index  (assuming  fixed effects  in each  case).  I then  re-run the
regressions  shown  in Table  4 using  these  "adjusted"  variables. The  results are
shown in Table 5 and are broadly similar to those shown in Table 4, as far as the
control variables are concerned.22 They also indicate again that the  "best"  results
are obtained when the globalization index is calculated with either a two- or three-
year  average  of the  original series  and  when  the  trade  openness  indicator  is
included.23 Compared  to  Table  4,  the  level  of  significance  of the  linear  term
involving the globalization  index drops when a two-lag average is used (it is now
significant  only  at  a  10  percent  level);  and  the  quadratic  term  remains  highly
significant.  Overall,  therefore,  this  attempt  to  correct  for the  indirect  impact  of
globalization  on  output  and  macroeconomic  discipline  leads  to  results  that  are
qualitatively  similar  to  those  obtained  previously  when  the  trade  openness
indicator  is  included  in  the  calculation  of  the  first  principal  component.  An
important  difference, however,  is the  drop in the value of the coefficients of the
linear term in  the globalization index between Tables 4 and 5. For instance, for the
two-year average lag, and with the trade openness indicator included, it falls from
0.027 to 0.015.  At the same  time, the coefficient on the quadratic term  changes
relatively little (from -0.021  to -0.028).  This is important because the shape of the
poverty-globalization  Laffer curve is very different  depending on the value of the
coefficient of the linear term.  To see this, let a > 0 be the coefficient of the linear
term,  and  3 < 0 the coefficient of the squared term;  the threshold value  beyond
which globalization starts reducing poverty is -al2,B. With 1  being more or less the
same  under the one-step and two-step estimation  results, the value of a plays a
crucial role.  Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the poverty-globalization Laffer curve
for  the  two  estimates  of  a  obtained  earlier  (and  for  ,B  = -0.02),  under  the
assumption that the constant term  in  the functional forms is the same.  Clearly, the
22Note  again  that  in Table  5 the  inflation  tax  rate  and  the  literacy rate  turned  out to be
incorrectly signed and (or) insignificant in some regressions, and were therefore excluded.
23As noted earlier, again, using three-year averages  may imply  excessive" smoothing of the
underlying series.
37lower  value  of  a  under  the  two-step  procedure  implies  (cetens  paribus)  a
significantly lower adverse effect of globalization on poverty.
VI.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Globalization,  or the  integration  of economies  and societies  through  trade,
investment,  finance,  information  and  labor  flows  is, in the  view  of  many,  an
inescapable feature of the world today.  On the one hand, there  is a considerable
body  of  opinion  arguing  that  globalization  has  led  to  substantial  economic
progress  among  rich  and  poor countries  alike and,  indeed,  may be the  principal
mechanism  for the intemational  convergence  of living  standards.  On  the other,
many  point to the challenges that it poses for many countries as well  as for the
most vulnerable socio-economic groups within countries.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  has  been  to  examine  the  extent  to  which
globalization  affects  the  poor.  Section  II presented  various  arguments  that  may
explain  how trade  and financial  integration  may hurt the  poor.  Two  main  points
emerged  from  the  discussion. The  first  is it  is usually difficult  to draw  clear-cut
theoretical  conclusions regarding  the effect of globalization on  poverty as a result
of conflicting effects, both in the short and the long  run. Empirical studies are thus
important to  assess whether  net effects  are  positive or negative.  The  second  is
that  it is possible that nonlinearities may be  involved in the relationship  between
globalization  and  poverty.  Accounting  for  these  effects  is crucial  for  empirical
testing.
The  second  part  presented  some  preliminary  evidence,  based  on  linear
cross-country  regressions  linking  various  measures  of  real  and  financial
integration  to  poverty.  The  regressions  (performed  over a group  of 11  low-  and
middle-income  countries  and  with  data  covering  the  late  1980s and  the  1990s)
38control  for  changes  in  income  per  capita  and  output  growth  rates,  as  well  as
various other macroeconomic  and  structural  variables,  such as the  inflation tax,
changes  in the  real  exchange  rate  and the terms of trade,  health  and  schooling
indicators,  and  macroeconomic  volatility. The third  part extended the analysis to
derive  a "globalization  index"  based  on  principal components  analysis (using  the
set  of  trade  and  financial  openness  indicators  defined  in  the  preliminary
regressions) and tested for both linear and nonlinear effects. The results indicate
that  there  appears  to  be  a  reasonably  robust,  non-monotonic  Laffer-type
relationship  between  poverty and globalization  (as  measured  by the first principal
component):  at  low  degrees  of globalization,  globalization  does  hurt  the  poor.
However, at higher levels, globalization leads to a decline in poverty.
What  is the  source  of this  nonlinearity?  At this  stage,  and  without  further
empirical  work,  I can offer only conjectures, based on  my analytical review of the
links between  globalization and  poverty. One  possible explanation is that beyond
a certain threshold  a greater degree of real and financial integration brings with it
(or induces governments to implement)  far-reaching domestic institutional reforms
that  improve  the  ability  of  private  agents  to  save  and  invest,  strengthen  the
financial  system  and  the  regulation  and  supervision  of financial  intermediaries,
and  more generally improve the "social and legal infrastructure"  that is conducive
to greater  risk taking.  Regardless  of the exact mechanism  that  may be at play,
however,  the striking  implication  of the poverty-globalization  Laffer curve  is that,
paradoxically,  globalization may  hurt  the poor in  some  countries  not because  it
went  too  far  but  rather  because  it  did  not  go  far  enough.  Put  differently,  by
focusing  on  different  portions  of  the  curve,  both  advocates  and  opponents  of
globalization have been missing part of the story.
I will  conclude with the usual  note of caution-the empirical  results  reported
in this  paper require  further testing to assess their robustness.  The existence of
nonlinearities  could  be  further  explored  by  using  splines  and  exploring  their
sensitivity to the choice of breakpoints. Altematively,  one could exploit techniques
such as projection pursuit (as  in Friedman  and  Stuetzle  (1981)) or the method  of
39altemating  conditional  expectations  (Breiman  and  Friedman  (1985)).  More
importantly perhaps,  the sample  size used in this study is small,  mostly due to the
lack  of  available  data  on  poverty  rates.  The  lack  of  a  sufficient  number  of
observations  prevents the  use of more  advanced  regression techniques,  such as
the GMM  method  used  by Hansen and  Tarp  (2001)  in a  different context,  which
would  allow  to  control  at  the  same  time  for  both  unobserved  country-specific
characteristics and endogeneity.  Moreover, the available data on both sides of the
regression  equation  are  not  highly  reliable.  As  is  well  known,  the  aggregate
measure of poverty used  in this study is  based on survey data;  but there are  large
differences across countries  in  measuring poverty from these micro  data  (related
most notably to differences in definitions of income or consumption),  which create
potentially serious  comparability  problems.  I have  used  'effective'  measures  of
trade  and  financial  integration,  but  the  data  are  not  without  problems.  Using
average  import  tariffs  does  not  account  for  the  existence  of  non-tariff  barriers
(which themselves  are very difficult to measure  with any degree of precision). An
altemative option  to measure  trade  openness  might  be  to use the new index  of
trade  restrictiveness  compiled  by  the  IMF,  which  is  based  on  a  variety  of
published and unpublished sources (see  Lankes (2002)); and as noted earlier, the
share of assets of the domestic financial system  held  by foreign  banks could be a
complementary  measure  of financial  globalization.  In both  cases,  however,  the
number of observations available remains an issue.
I also found that fixed effects  (which  were  not  reported  here  to save  space)
are  important and statistically significant in  many cases,  suggesting that  country-
specific factors  are important  in determining  the behavior of poverty rates.  There
is therefore  a  risk of misspecification that may persist despite my effort to control
adequately  for  various  determinants  of  poverty.  More  generally,  parameter
heterogeneity  is  a  key  problem  in  the  type  of  cross-country,  growth-poverty
regressions  presented  in this study. Indeed,  an implicit assumption in this type of
regressions  is that the parameters  are constant across  countries, that  is, that all
countries follow the same  underlying  model  relating  growth  and poverty.  If one is
40interested  only in  estimating  parameter  averages, this can be weakened  slightly,
by assuming only that parameters are distributed  independently of the variables in
the  regression. Yet  even this weaker assumption  is likely to be  too  strong.  One
can  easily suggest examples  of parameters  that  are likely to  be correlated  with
variables  in  the  regression--for  instance,  macroeconomic  instability  may  be
associated  with  both  lower  growth  and a  lower impact of growth  on  poverty,  so
that the coefficient on macroeconomic instability should ideally be allowed to vary
across  countries.  A  sensible  response  to  this  is  to  find  ways  of  modeling
heterogeneity.  For instance, in the above example,  it might be possible to reduce
the  extent  of  heterogeneity  by  introducing  an  interaction  term  between
macroeconomic  instability and  growth,  and  by using heteroskedasticty-consistent
standard  errors for inference.  Regardless,  however, the regression model  remains
likely to embody restrictions  on the parameters,  which make  using the  model at
the individual country level  problematic at best. An  altemative approach would  be
to  perform  explicit  tests  explicitly  for  pooling  and  parameter  heterogeneity.
Unfortunately, the lack of observations remains a serious constraint.24
24 To  detect parameter  heterogeneity  (or the  Opoolabiiity"  of the  data) one could  use a  two-
step Chow test  (as,  for  instance,  in Evans,  Green,  and  Murinde  (2002)),  or the  Dutta-Leon  test
(see  Dutta  and  Leon  (1991)).  Other  methods,  based  on  Bayesian  analysis,  are  described  by
Maddala and Wu  (1996,  2000).  However,  none of these tests can be implemented  here because
they all require sufficiently long time series for each individual country.
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Country Names,  Variable  Definitions, and  Data  Sources
This  Appendix  presents  the  list  of  countries  included  in  the  regression
results presented  in the Tables, a more  precise definition of the variables used in
the regressions, and sources of the data.
Countries
Regressions  with  the complete  sample  are  based  on the following  list of
countries (years of observation on poverty rates in parentheses):  Colombia (1991,
1992),  Dominican  Republic  (1989,  1992),  India  (1992,  1994),  Indonesia  (1987,
1990,  1996,  1998-99),  Jordan  (1991,  1997),  Morocco  (1985,  1991,  1999),  Peru
(1986,  1994,  1997), Philippines (1985,  1991,  1994,  1997), Sri Lanka  (1986,  1991,
1996),  Thailand  (1990,  1992),  and  Tunisia  (1985,  1990).  As  noted  in  the  text,
these countries are  all of those  for which  at least two data  points on poverty (as
measured  by  the  headcount  index)  were  available  in  the  World  Bank  LDB
database,  taking  into  account  as  well  the  availability  of  data  on  some  of the
control variables and the globalization indicators.
Definition and source of varlables used in regressions
POV:  Poverty index. Source: World Bank LDB Database.
INFLTAX:  Inflation tax rate  in terms of consumer prices.  It is defined as the ratio
of the inflation rate  over one plus inflation rate.  Source:  2001 World  Development
Indicators CD-ROM  (WDI).
TRANSGDP:  Subsidies  and  other  current  govemment  transfers  as  a  share  of
GDP. Source: WDI.
LITY: Youth total literacy rate as a share of people ages 15-24. Source: WDI.
LHOSPITAL:  Log of hospital beds per 1,000 people. Source: WDI.
LGDPPC:  Log of GDP per capita measured  at purchasing power parity exchange
rates. Source: WDI.
REALGR:  Growth  rate  of per  capita  real  GDP,  measured  at purchasing  power
parity exchange rates.  Source: WDI.
REALEX:  Percentage  change  in  the  real  effective  exchange  rate.  A  rise  is  a
depreciation.  Source:  Intemational  Financial Statistics, IMF.
42FDI:  Foreign direct investment as a share of GDP  (net inflows). The averages are
defined over 1, 2, and 3 lagged years.  Source: WDI.
OPEN: Ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and services  in percent
of GDP. The averages are defined over 1, 2, and 3 lagged years. Source: WDI.
TARIFF:  Ratio of import duties over imports. The averages are defined  over 1, 2,
and 3 lagged years. Source: WDI.
CTOT:  Percentage change in the terms of trade index. Source: WDI.
VREALXL:  Measure  of  macroeconomic  volatility.  It is  given  by the  ratio  of the
standard deviation of real effective exchange rate at t, t-1 ,t-2, t-3 to the average of
it for the same period (coefficient of variation).
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Calculation of Principal Components
This Appendix describes  briefly the methodology  of principal components
analysis (PCA) and explains how PCA was applied in this study.25
PCA is based on a key result from matrix algebra, according to which a pxp
symmetric,  nonsingular matrix,  such as the correlation matrix  R,  may be reduced
to a diagonal  matrix A by pre- and  post-multiplying  it by a  particular orthonormal
matrix U, which is such that
U'RU = A.
The  diagonal  elements of A,  Xi,  %2,...,  kp,  are the  characteristic roots  (or
eigenvalues)  of  R,  which  are  obtained  from  the  solution  of  the  characteristic
equation:
JR -XIl = 0,
where I is the identity matrix.  This equation  produces a pth degree polynomial  in
X, from which the values X1, X2,...,  Xp are obtained.
When  using  correlation  matrices  in  PCA,  the first step  is to put all  of the
data  in  standard  units; that is, perform  the operation  (x-x)/s  for each variable,
where  x is the  mean  of original  variable  and s  is the standard  deviation.  These
standardized  data  are  then  treated  as  observations.  By  doing  this,  all  of the
transformed  variables have  unit variances  and the resulting covariance  matrix is
actually the correlation matrix of the original variables.
The  principal  axis  transformation  transforms  p  correlated  variables  xi,
x2,...,  xp  into p new  uncorrelated  variables  z1,  Z2,...,  zp.  The  coordinate  axes of
these new variables are described by the characteristic vectors u, which make  up
the matrix U of direction cosines used in the transformation:
z= U'[x-x].
Herexand  x-are pxl vectors of observations on the original  variables and
their means.
25The following  brief presentation  of PCA  is based on  Morrison  (1990)  and Jackson (1991),
and  uses the  correlation  matrix,  instead of the variance-covariance  matrix.  The  reason is  that, in
general, even if the original variables used in PCA are in the same units, their variances may differ
widely,  often  because  they are  related  to  their  means.  This  may  give  undue  weight  to  certain
variables.
44The transformed  variables  are called the  principal  components  of  x. The
ith principal component is
Zj  = U;[x-]
and has mean zero and variance Xi, the ith characteristic root.
Let
S 0  ...  O 
D =  2.. 
L  O  *--.  sp_
that is, D is a diagonal matrix of standard deviations of the original variables.  The




This matrix gives the correlation between the principal components  and the
original  variables.  It can  be  used  to  determine  the  correlation  of  each  principal
component  with each of the original  variables.  Specifically, the correlation  of the
ith principal component,  z1, and the jth original variable, xj, is equal to
r,,'  = ui, 
In  this  study,  the  first  principal  components  are  calculated  country  by
country,  before  running the poverty  regressions.  The following  periods  are  used
for each of the. 11  countries  referred  to in the text and  in Appendix A:  Colombia
(1980-99),  Dominican  Republic (1980-99),  India  (1:980-99),  lndonesia  (1982-99),
Jordan (1980-99),  Morocco (1980-99),  Peru  (1980-99),  the Philippines (1980-99),
Sri  Lanka  (1980-99),  Thailand  (1980-99),  and  Tunisia  (1980-99).  Applying  the
formula above indicates that the correlation of the first principal component with all
of the original variables is in general fairly high.
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50Table 1
Poverty and Globalization:  Basic Regression Results
(OLS with fixed effects)
Dependent variable:  Headcount poverty index
Trade Openness Indicator  Average Tariff Rate
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
INFLTAX  0.139  0.083  0.010  _  0.004  0.025
(0.929)  (0.601)  (0.071)  (0.054)  (0.260)
TRANSGDP (-1)  -0.475  -0.652  -0.996  -2.521  -2.354  -1.904
(-0.451)  (-0.614)  (-0.940)  (-3.363)  (-4.014)  (-3.665)
LITY  -1.824  -1.768  -1.944  -1.580  -1.762  -1.754
(-4.547)  (-3.929)  (-3.857)  (-4.878)  (-7.054)  (-6.631)
LHOSPITAL  -0.148  -0.122  -0.133  -0.125  -0.135  -0.111
(-1.434)  (-1.184)  (-1.261)  (-2.064)  (-2.783)  (-2.461)
GDPPC (-1)  0.007  0.002  0.027  -0.061  -0.059  -0.051
(0.131)  (0.044)  (0.409)  (-2.448)  (-1.714)  (-1.417)
REALGR (-1)  -0.577  -0.521  -0.500  -0.264  -0.448  -0.478
(-4.187)  (-3.768)  (-3.682)  (-2.626)  (-6.745)  (-7.365)
REALEX  -0.097  -0.074  -0.062  -0.081  -0.035  -0.024
(-3.673)  (-2.969)  (-2.205)  (-3.391)  (-2.352)  (-1.523)
CTOT  0.152  0.170  0.173  0.377  0.253  0.205
(0.762)  (0.852)  (0.857)  (3.459)  (2.079)  (1.696)
VREALXL  0.359  0.354  0.400  0.644  0.475  0.380
(1.726)  (1.680)  (1.907)  (6.061)  (5.665)  (4.228)
AV_FDII  0.103  - _  0.830
(0.173)  (1.539)
AVJFDI2  0.306  _  0.324  _
(0.378)  (0.475)
AV_FD13  - - 0.195  0.112
(0.271)  (0.188)
AV_OPENI  -0.193  _
(-1.578)
AV_OPEN2  _  -0.199  _
(-1.396)
AV_OPEN3  _  -0.261  _
(-1.544)
AV_TARIFFI  - _  - -0.387  _
(-3.809)
AV_TARIFF2  - - -0.655  _
(-4.631)
AV_TARIFF3  _  - - - _  -0.853
(4.475)
Adj. R2  0.909  0.905  0.909  0.931  0.921  0.925
Number of obs.  29  29  29  30  29  29
Standard Efror of  0.042  0.043  0.042  0.038  0.039  0.038
Regression
Note:  INFLTAX is the inflation tax rate. It is defined as the ratio of the inflation  rate to one plus inflation rate. The inflation rate is the
annual change  in the consumer price index.  TRANSGDP is transfers  as a share of GDP. LITY is the literacy rate for the youth as a share of
total population.  LHOSPITAL is the log of the number of  beds per 1000 people. GDPPC(-1)  is the lagged value of the log of the GDP per
capita (purchasing power parity).  REALGR(-I) is the lagged  value of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity).
REALEX is the annual change in the real effective exchange rate index (a rise is depreciation).  CTOT  is the percentage change in the terms
of trade. VREALXL  is the volatility measure of the real effective exchange rate. It is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of a
variable for t, t- I,  t-2 and t-3 to the average value for the same period. AV_FDI  is the average  value of foreign direct investment as a share of
GDP. AV_OPEN is the average value of openness, which is the ratio of the sum of imports and exports of  goods and services to GDP (all in
nominal terms). AV_TARIFF is the average  value of the tariff rate, which is the ratio of import duties to imports.  1,2, and 3 stands for  the
mean of a variable at t-l, at t-l and t-2, and at t-l, t-2, and t-3, respectively.
51Table 2
Proportion of Total Variance Explained by the First Principal Component
Country  Excluding trade openness indicator  Including trade openness indicator
First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average  First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average
Colombia  0.692  0.711  0.723  0.564  0.583  0.598
Dominican Republic  0.605  0.611  0.622  0.539  0.574  0.600
India  0.843  0.856  0.870  0.850  0.860  0.872
Indonesia  0.566  0.679  0.704  0.577  0.664  0.728
Jordan  0.687  0.700  0.682  0.502  0.505  0.498
Morocco  0.600  0.612  0.647  OA54  0.421  0.446
Peru  0.757  0.805  0.831  0.528  0.610  0.651
Philippines  0.658  0.569  0.513  0.697  0.665  0.640
Sri Lanka  0.774  0.832  0.879  0.764  0.821  0.880
Thailand  0.837  0.819  0.804  0.839  0.837  0.835
Tunisia  0.638  0.613  0.603  0.633  0.638  0.659
AVERAGE  (all  0.696  0.710  0.716  0.632  0.653  0.673
countries)
AVERAGE  (excluding  0.696  0.736  0.735  0.736  0.718  0.726
countries for which the
principal  component is
less than 0.6)
Note:  The principal component  is always constructed with the foreign direct investment  ratio and one minus the tariff rate.  It is
calculated  with either the trade openness indicator included or excluded.  For each country, the periods are reported in the appendix.
52Table 3
Poverty and Globalization Index: Linear Regression Results
(OLS with fixed effects)
Dependent variable: Headcount  poverty index
Excluding trade openness indicator  Including  trade openness  indicator
First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average  First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average
INFLTAX  0.020  0.105  0.179  0.029  0.083  0.173
(0.295)  (1.718)  (2.223)  (0.330)  (1.245)  (2.126)
TRANSGDP  (-1)  -1.932  -1.708  -0.949  -1.089  -1.084  -0.690
(-2.947)  (-3.465)  (-1.746)  (-1.181)  (-1.680)  (-1.131)
LITY  -0.959  -0.751  -0.693  -1.675  -1.495  -1.194
(-3.913)  (-2.308)  (-1.516)  (-5.912)  (-5.480)  (-3.320)
LHOSPITAL  -0.045  -0.056  -0.056  -0.048  -0.037  -0.022
(-0.709)  (-1.202)  (-1.298)  (-0.675)  (-0.673)  (-0.435)
GDPPC (-  I)  -0.136  -0.159  -0.166  -0.067  -0.107  -0.138
(-3.495)  (-5.089)  (-3.820)  (-1.368)  (-2.211)  (-2.824)
REALGR (-1)  -0.317  -0.286  -0.337  -0.344  -0.314  -0.326
(-3.476)  (-2.942)  (-3.152)  (-2.808)  (-2.657)  (-2.871)
REALEX  -0.078  -0.067  -0.053  -0.036  -0.041  -0.041
(-3.809)  (4.377)  (-3.139)  (-1.133)  (-2.035)  (-2.395)
CTOT  0.246  0.183  0.177  0.278  0.224  0.195
(2.176)  (1.495)  (1.350)  (2.047)  (1.793)  (1.514)
VREALXL  0.520  0.348  0.212  0.364  0.301  0.205
(5.049)  (4.855)  (1.888)  (2.812)  (2.951)  (1.716)
GLOBINDEXI  0.025  0.0106
(4.075)  (0.955)
GLOBINDEX2  0.028  0.016
(3.878)  (1.702)
GLOBINDEX3  0.025  0.018
(2.704)  (2.118)
Adj. R2  0.920  0.926  0.926  0.902  0.909  0.913
Number of obs.  29  29  29  29  29  29
Standard  Error of  0.039  0.038  0.038  0.044  0.042  0.041
Regression
Note: See the note of  Table  I for the definition of the variables.  GLOBINDEX I is the globalization index calculated as the first
principal component of AV_TARRIFFI  and AVJFDII. AV_OPENI  is either included  or excluded.  Similarly,  GLOBINDEX2 and
GLOBINDEX3 are calculated as the first principal components of AV_TARIFF2,  AV_FD12, and AV_OPEN2, and AV_TAR[FF3,
AV_FDI13, and AV_OPEN3, successively.
53Table 4
Poverty and Globalization Index: Nonlinear Regression Results
(OLS with fixed effects)
Dependent variable:  Headcount  poverty index
Excluding trade openness indicator  Including trade openness indicator
First lag  2-lag average  3-lag  average  First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average
INPLTAX  0.133  0.273  0.081  0.157
(2.206)  (3.177)  (1.204)  (1.886)
TRANSGDP  (-1)  -2.213  -0.746  -1.661  -1.134  -0.101
(-3.228)  (-2.001)  (-2.377)  (-1 .915)  (-0.254)
LITY  -0.976  -1.148  0.389  -1.762  -2.255  -1.917
(-3.320)  (4.159)  (1.247)  (-4.770)  (-5.841)  (-5.898)
GDPPC (-1)  -0.119  -0.119  -0.224  -0.089  -0.122  -0.097
(-3.587)  (-3.802)  (4.554)  (-1.785)  (-3.690)  (-2.186)
REALGR  (-1)  -0.097  -0.550  -0.471  -0.179  -0.881  -1.050
(-0.809)  (-5.069)  (-3.625)  (-1.652)  (-3.911)  (4.286)
REALEX  -0.079  0.011  -0.014  -0.051  -0.074  -0.073
(-2.594)  (0.367)  (-0.741)  (-1.258)  (-3.707)  (4.826)
CTOT  0.281  0.076  0.017  0.285  -0.079  -0.037
(2.826)  (0.597)  (0.142)  (2.617)  (-0.581)  (-0.321)
VREALXL  0.614  0.234  0.087  0.477  0.447  0.340
(6.192)  (3.186)  (0.791)  (4.175)  (4.231)  (3.514)
GLOBINDEXI  0.030  0.022
(4.448)  (2.190)
GLOBINDEX1^2  -0.008  -0.002
(-1.395)  (-0.972)
GLOBINDEX2  0.026  0.027
(3.912)  (3.921)
GLOBINDEX2A2  -0.015  -0.021
(-2.533)  (-2.915)
GLOBINDEX3  0.035  0.025
(3.679)  (3.839)
GLOBINDEX3A2  -0.012  -0.021
(-2.390)  (-3.033)
Adj. R2  0.940  0.939  0.931  0.927  0.954  0.958
Number of obs.  30  29  30  30  29  29
Standard Error of  0.035  0.034  0.036  0.039  0.030  0.028
Regression
Note:  See the note of Table  I and Table 4 for the definition of the variables. GLOBINDEXIA2,  GLOBINDEX2^2,  and GLOBINDEX3^2
is the square term ofGLOBINDEXI,  GLOBINDEX2,  and GLOBINDEX3,  successively.
54Table 5
Poverty and Globalization Index: Nonlinear Regression Results
(OLS with fixed effects, Two-step Procedure)
Dependent variable:  Headcount poverty index
Excluding trade openness indicator  Including trade openness indicator
First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average  First lag  2-lag average  3-lag average
RINFLTAX  0.041  0.148  0.153  0.224  0.149
(0.558)  (1.697)  (2.043)  (2.392)  (1.562)
TRANSGDP (-1)  -3.078  -1.805  -1.100  -2.965  -0.289  -0.140
(-2.922)  (-1.428)  (-0.990)  (-3.096)  (-0.333)  (-0.172)
LITY  -1.212  -0.949
(-0.945)  (-0.784)
RGDPPC (-I)  -0.202  -0.183  -0.149  -0.151  -0.182  -0.109
(4.843)  (-3.950)  (4.393)  (-5.120)  (-2.924)  (-2.171)
RREALGR (-I)  -0.265  -0.367  -0.502  -0.253  -1.136  -1.061
(-3.009)  (-2.617)  (-3.347)  (-2.578)  (4.133)  (-3.500)
REALEX  -0.074  -0.050  -0.030  -0.098  -0.083  -0.079
(-2.985)  (-1.106)  (-1.290)  (-2.643)  (-3.367)  (-3.818)
CTOT  OA04  0.349  0.327  0.488  -0.222  -0.068
(2.497)  (1.617)  (1.718)  (3.446)  (-1.366)  (-0.347)
RVREALXL  0.578  0.373  0.325  0.703  0.354  0.387
(3.772)  (1.965)  (2.054)  (4.311)  (3.079)  (2.757)
GLOBINDEXI  0.013  0.004
(2.132)  (0.710)
GLOBINDEXIA2  -0.004  -0.003
(-1.064)  (-1.285)
GLOBINDEX2  0.005  0.015
(0.891)  (1.569)
GLOBINDEX2A2  -0.005  ,  -0.028
(-0.819)  (-4.005)
GLOBINDEX3  0.006  0.015
(0.969)  (1.369)
GLOBINDEX3A2  -0.008  -0.023
(-1.481)  (-2.808)
Adj. R2  0.936  0.932  0.924  0.939  0.949  0.937
Number of obs.  26  26  26  27  26  26
Standard Error of  0.035  0.036  0.038  0.036  0.031  0.035
Regression
Note:  See the note of Tables I and 3 for the definition of the variables.  RINFL is the residual measure obtained by regressing NFL
on fixed effects and GLOBINDEXI,  GLOBINDEX2,  or GLOBINDEX3.  RGDPPC  is the residual measure obtained by regressing
GDPPC on fixed effects  and GLOBINDEXI,  GLOBINDEX2,  or GLOBINDEX3.  RREALGR is the residual measure obtained by
regressing REALGR on fixed effects and GLOBINDEXI,  GLOBINDEX2, or GLOBINDEX3.  RVREALXL is the residual measure
obtained by regressing  VREALXL on fixed  effects and GLOBINDEXI,  GLOBINDEX2,  or GLOBINDEX3.
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